IPC 300→BNS 101

IPC 300 to BNS 101: Murder

Section 300 IPC (1860) replaced by Section 101 BNS (2023)

View IPC Section 300 →View BNS Section 101 →

IPC 300 to BNS 101 at a Glance

Section 300 IPC (Murder) is now Section 101 BNS, in force from 1 July 2024. What changed is set out below.

What Changed From IPC 300 to BNS 101?

Section 300 IPC is now Section 101 BNS. The four limbs of murder are set out as clauses a to d where the IPC had 2ndly, 3rdly and 4thly, and the provisos to Exception 1 appear as clauses a to c under a proviso clause. The four limbs and five Exceptions are the same in substance.

IPC 300 vs BNS 101: Comparison Table

AspectIPC 1860 (repealed)BNS 2023 (in force)
Section300101
OffenceMurderSame
PunishmentNone. Section 300 IPC is a definition and prescribes no sentence of imprisonment. Murder is punished under Section 302 IPC with death or imprisonment for life.None. Section 101 BNS is a definition and prescribes no sentence of imprisonment. Murder is punished under Section 103 BNS with death or imprisonment for life.
FineNone under Section 300 IPC. Fine is provided under the punishing provision in Section 302 IPC.None under Section 101 BNS. Fine is provided under the punishing provision in Section 103 BNS.
BailNon-BailableSame
CognizanceNon-CognizableSame
CompoundableNon-CompoundableSame

IPC 300 and BNS 101: Bare Act Text Side by Side

IPC 1860 (repealed)

Section 300, IPC 1860

300. Murder.—Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— 2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— 3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or— 4thly.—If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Illustrations (a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder. (b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death. (c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z's death. (d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual. Exception 1.—When culpable homicide is not murder.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. The above exception is subject to the following provisos: First That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person. Secondly That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant. Thirdly That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. Illustrations (a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z's child. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation. (b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide. (c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers. (d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate, Z says that he does not believe a word of A's deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder. (e) A attempts to pull Z's nose, Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, inasmuch as the provocation was given by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence. (f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B's rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B's hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder. Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. Illustration Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide. Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused. Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent. Illustration A, by instigation, voluntarily causes, Z, a person under eighteen years of age to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z's youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.
BNS 2023 (in force)

Section 101, BNS 2023

Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder,— (a) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; or (b) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (c) if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or (d) if the person committing the act by which the death is caused, knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. Illustrations. (a) A shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in consequence. A commits murder. (b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death. (c) A intentionally gives Z a sword-cut or club-wound sufficient to cause the death of a man in the ordinary course of nature. Z dies in consequence. Here A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death. (d) A without any excuse fires a loaded cannon into a crowd of persons and kills one of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated design to kill any particular individual. Exception 1.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident: Provided that the provocation is not,— (a) sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person; (b) given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant; (c) given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence. Explanation.—Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact. Illustrations. (a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z, intentionally kills Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation. (b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A. A, on this provocation, fires a pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but merely culpable homicide. (c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent passion by the arrest, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of his powers. (d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe a word of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder. (e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the provocation was giving by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private defence. (f) Z strikes B. B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a bystander, intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife into B’s hand for that purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder. Exception 2.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence. Illustration. Z attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable homicide. Exception 3.—Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused. Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. Explanation.—It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault. Exception 5.—Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or takes the risk of death with his own consent. Illustration. A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a child to commit suicide. Here, on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable of giving consent to his own death; A has therefore abetted murder.

Ingredients: IPC 300 vs BNS 101

Under IPC 300
  1. The accused committed culpable homicide as defined in Section 299 IPC
  2. The act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and is done without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury
  3. The act does not fall within any of the five statutory Exceptions
Under BNS 101
  1. Culpable homicide causing death of a human being
  2. Doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death, or with the intention of causing bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and is done without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury
  3. Absence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the five statutory Exceptions

What IPC 300 to BNS 101 Means for Pending Cases

For Section 300 IPC (now Section 101 BNS): the definition of murder and its five Exceptions remain unchanged in substance, so an act committed after the BNS came into force is assessed on the same legal elements under Section 101 BNS.

FAQs: IPC 300 to BNS 101

What changed in the definition of murder when Section 300 IPC became Section 101 BNS?▼

The definition is unchanged in substance. Section 101 BNS formats the four limbs of murder as clauses a to d and the provisos to Exception 1 as clauses a to c, retaining the four limbs and five Exceptions of Section 300 IPC.

Where does murder sit in the BNS, in place of Section 300 IPC?▼

In Section 101 BNS, in Chapter VI, Of Offences Affecting the Human Body, under the sub-heading Of offences affecting life.

Does Section 300 IPC or Section 101 BNS apply to an act done before 1 July 2024?▼

Section 300 IPC. Section 358 BNS repealed the IPC from 1 July 2024 but saves any liability already incurred under it, so an act done before that date is still dealt with under Section 300 IPC. Section 101 BNS governs acts done on or after 1 July 2024.

Disclaimer: This comparison is for informational purposes only. The new criminal laws came into effect on 1 July 2024. Consult a qualified advocate for legal advice.

Sources: Indian Penal Code, 1860 · Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 · Last updated: 16 Oct 2026 ·